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INTRODUCTION  
Law does not play much of an explicit role in A Theory of Fields,1 
the pathbreaking book by Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam about col-
lective action in society. The authors focus on the notion of a “strategic 
action field,” defined as a social order in which actors are attuned to and 
interact based on several important sociological factors, including shared 
understandings about purpose, relationships to others in the field, and 
“rules” governing legitimate action.2 Thus framed, “rules” in the abstract 
sense are present in a limited sense in the theory. However, the authors 
do not distinguish among rules governing legitimate action in a field, nor 
do they describe the extent to which rules are private or public; instead, 
they group together all collective actors—“organizations, clans, supply 
chains, social movements, and governmental systems”3—and describe 
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 1. NEIL FLIGSTEIN & DOUG MCADAM, A THEORY OF FIELDS (reprt. ed. 2015). 
 2. See id. at 9. The authors discuss both the impact of state strategic action fields on nonstate 
strategic action fields and the dependence of states and state strategic action fields on nonstate stra-
tegic action fields, but this discussion is more about the role of the state in society than it is about 
law and legal rules. See id. at 71–77. 
 3. Id. at 9. 
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the strategic action fields associated with these actors without particular 
reference to the role of law. 
One of the most provocative ways in which Fligstein and McAdam 
distinguish among strategic action fields—without respect to the role of 
rules—is the extent to which such fields are focused on “material” as 
opposed to “existential” concerns. The authors hypothesize that 
“[p]eople do what they do both to achieve instrumental advantage and to 
fashion meaningful worlds for themselves and others.”4 Accordingly, one 
can imagine strategic action fields as arrayed along a continuum with 
purely “material” as the extreme at one pole and purely “existential” as 




The distinction between “material” and “existential” plays a promi-
nent role in A Theory of Fields, and it played a prominent role in discus-
sions at the Berle VII Symposium. In general, the authors advocated the 
importance of the ongoing use of social skills and the collaborative ef-
forts to seek meaning, particularly in ways beyond the merely “materi-
al.”5 However, the extent to which rules might matter in these efforts was 
less clear. 
Overall, Fligstein and McAdam seek to use the concept of a strate-
gic action field to develop a theory of social change and stability.6 Yet 
social change and stability are inextricably linked to law, legal regimes, 
and regulatory structures. During the Berle VII Symposium, I raised the 
point about the absence of law and regulation from the theory of strategic 
action fields. I attempted to demonstrate that law and regulation matter, 
substantially, in the application of Fligstein and McAdam’s theory. The 
two authors seemed open during our discussions to the notion that law 
might be added as a theoretical “friendly amendment” to their theory. 
With their openness as a motivation, I attempt in this brief Article to 
sketch how one might make such an addition to their theory. 
Specifically, I suggest here that the theory of “meso-level” (or mid-
dle-level) social orders advanced by Fligstein and McAdam might profit-
ably be expanded to include two continua, rather than one.7 The first con-
tinuum, the primary “x-axis” of the theory posited in A Theory of Fields, 
                                                 
 4. Id. at 43. 
 5. See id. at 46–47 (arguing that fields are created and sustained by the ongoing use of social 
skills); id. at 49 (“[F]or us, the essence of human sociability is collaborative meaning making.”). 
 6. See generally id. 
 7. Id. 
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is the notion that strategic action fields can be described as “material” or 
“existential,” or some combination of the two, as I suggest above.8 The 
second continuum, the secondary “y-axis” of the theory and my “friendly 
amendment,” is the notion that the description of strategic action fields 
varies based on the application of law. 
My primary argument is that the theory of strategic action fields 
can be expanded to include this second continuum, based on the degree 
of law applicable to a particular field. Specifically, at one end of this se-
cond axis is the notion of an entirely unregulated strategic action field, 
which is largely governed by private ordering. At the other end of this 
second axis is the notion of a highly regulated strategic action field, 
which is largely governed by state action and intervention. My claim is 
that strategic action fields can more usefully be described by expanding 
A Theory of Fields to include this additional law/regulation axis. 
Thus, in graphical terms, although Fligstein and McAdam’s theory 
can be visualized as one horizontal axis, running from material to exis-
tential, as amended, the theory also would include a vertical axis based 
on the degree of applicability of law/regulation. To simplify the analysis, 
one might imagine four quadrants of strategic action fields, as depicted 
below: 
 
  | 




  Unregulated  |        Unregulated/Material Unregulated/Existential 
|  
| 
  |_____________________________________________ 
         Material           Existential 
 
In the upper left quadrant are regulated/material fields, where ex-
amples might include financial institutions, such as banks and insurance 
companies, which generally are subject to a complex web of regulations 
and multiple regulators and are focused primarily on monetary concerns. 
In contrast, in the lower left quadrant are unregulated/material fields, 
examples of which might include hedge funds or offshore investment 
vehicles that (at least until recently) generally have been outside the pur-
                                                 
 8. See id. at 15. 
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view of the most onerous regulations but also are focused primarily on 
monetary concerns. As noted below, the types of strategic action fields 
vary considerably between these two quadrants. 
In the upper right quadrant are regulated/existential fields, which 
might include educational institutions and hospitals that generally are 
subject to a complex web of regulations and multiple regulators but 
(generally, or perhaps hopefully?) are focused less on monetary concerns 
than their central missions (e.g., educating students or attending to pa-
tients’ health). In the lower right quadrant are unregulated/existential 
fields, examples of which might include Super PACs or private philan-
thropic organizations that generally are outside the purview of the most 
onerous regulations but are focused less on monetary concerns than on 
their central missions (e.g., supporting a political party or candidate, or 
pressing a particular social objective). My claim in Part I is that adding 
law/regulation to the analysis can enrich our understanding of the role of 
strategic action fields. 
I further support my claim that strategic action fields are more use-
fully described using this expanded law-inclusive rubric in Part II by ap-
plying the new framework to analyze research by Bruce Carruthers on 
credit rating agencies.9 The expanded version of the theory suggests that 
Professor Carruthers is actually telling two very different stories about 
credit rating agencies, depending on the applicable time periods and de-
gree of regulation. The first story, which is firmly situated in the unregu-
lated/material quadrant, is focused on the reputational capital of rating 
agencies and their ability to generate valuable information. The second 
story, which occupies the regulated/material quadrant, is focused on the 
exploitation of regulation, with reputation acting as only a minimal con-
straint and valuable information being a secondary consideration. Some 
of the normative implications of Carruthers’s work are that the role of the 
credit ratings in strategic action fields might better serve society if they 
shifted away from the material side of the continuum and—in some 
meaningful ways—away from the regulated side of the continuum. Simi-
lar conclusions hold for Fligstein and McAdam’s discussion of the mort-
gage markets, including an analysis of the degree of regulation that can 
enrich their discussion of the recent financial crisis. 
Overall, my hope is to offer a way to integrate A Theory of Fields 
into legal scholarship. In this vein, I conclude the Article by offering 
some thoughts about how Fligstein and McAdam’s points about academ-
                                                 
 9. See infra Part II. 
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ia might also be expanded to apply to legal scholarship as well as aca-
demic work in sociology. 
I. STRATEGIC ACTION FIELDS AND LAW/REGULATION 
To repeat, my central claim is that strategic action fields vary con-
siderably depending on the degree of applicable law/regulation. I now 
consider in greater detail the extent to which strategic action fields de-
pend on law. 
Fligstein and McAdam distinguish between a strategic action field 
and an unorganized social space, the central difference being the degree 
to which the various qualities of a field are well-defined.10 They argue 
that the strategic action field is the fundamental unit of collective action, 
sitting at the “meso-level” among social orders (as contrasted with mi-
cro- or macro-level social orders).11 Thus, the strategic action field is the 
crucial agent of social change and stability, given its shifting boundaries 
over time.12 
Strategic action fields include incumbents, challengers, and govern-
ance units.13 Obviously, power occupies a central role in the tension be-
tween incumbents and challengers. In the theory, governance units are 
said to aid incumbents, though the precise mechanism is not apparent.14 
Moreover, during times of social change, governance units presumably 
shift their degree of aid to various parties, as challengers come to occupy 
power.15 
However, it would be misleading to characterize strategic action 
fields as rotating exclusively, or even substantially, based on power. In-
stead, Fligstein and McAdam describe the importance of “social skill” in 
the fluctuations and advancement of strategic action fields.16 Some actors 
develop social skill and use that skill to advocate among other partici-
pants in the strategic action field.17 Social skill crucially incorporates 
what Fligstein and McAdam call the “existential functions of the so-
cial.”18 To the extent a strategic action field appeals to the “existential,” 
                                                 
 10. See FLIGSTEIN & MCADAM, supra note 1, at 5. 
 11. Id. at 9. 
 12. Id. at 8. 
 13. Id. at 13. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 14–15. 
 17. Id. at 15. 
 18. Id. at 3–4. 
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social skill presumably plays an important role in deciding the direction 
and action within a strategic action field.19 
Of course, external factors also are important to the theory of stra-
tegic action fields. Fligstein and McAdam recognize not only the broader 
field environment but also the importance of exogenous shocks, mobili-
zation, and the onset of contention within the field.20 The tension within 
a strategic action field is often generated from outside the field; then 
there are episodes of contention within the field. The resolution and set-
tlement of such tension can be based on the degree of power among vari-
ous actors, but they also depend crucially on social skill. 
Fligstein and McAdam recognize that “[s]urely we are not social in 
the same sense that ants are.”21 As they posit, there are various character-
istics of the uniquely human nature of strategic action fields, including 
not only tools and language, which animals also use in certain limited 
circumstances, but also existential fear and uncertainty.22 These are the 
behaviors that crucially emerge from the sense that we are not alone.23 
As noted above, Fligstein and McAdam allow for both the material 
and existential: “People do what they do both to achieve instrumental 
advantage and to fashion meaningful worlds for themselves and oth-
ers.”24 As they describe, “for us, the essence of human sociability is col-
laborative meaning making.”25  
In a strategic action field that is largely unregulated and outside the 
scope of legal rules, reputation is likely to operate as the primary con-
straint on the actors in the field. Fligstein and McAdam are, of course, 
correct that strategic action fields vary considerably, even when largely 
unregulated, in terms of the degree to which they represent materi-
al/existential concerns. 
Legal scholars, including Robert Ellickson and Lisa Bernstein, have 
examined unregulated strategic action fields in numerous contexts, find-
ing that groups develop extensive enforcement networks and norms to 
govern their conduct.26 These developments occur even when the rele-
vant enterprise is largely economic and the goals of the participants do 
                                                 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 19–21. 
 21. Id. at 34. 
 22. Id. at 41–42. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 43. 
 25. Id. at 49. 
 26 . See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1994); Lisa Bernstein, Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Im-
manent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996). 
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not include much “collaborative meaning making,”27 apart from money 
making. 
One might think about strategic action fields in the unregulated set-
ting as involving primarily “horizontal” social skill, among the partici-
pants in the specific activity. Diamond merchants and lobster fisherman 
are interacting primarily with each other and others related directly to 
their endeavors. Accordingly, the description of strategic action fields is 
most usefully described by atomistic economic theories of rational actors 
and the theory of agency costs. Sociology generally occupies a less 
prominent role than economics in describing such actions. 
However, to the extent unregulated strategic action fields exhibit 
existential characteristics, they are most usefully described using princi-
ples of sociology, and also behavioral economics. Indeed, much of what 
Fligstein and McAdam were discussing during the Symposium is best 
categorized by the unregulated/existential quadrant of the theory, where 
participants are not strictly behaving according to a rational economic 
actor agenda and where collaborative meaning making is more meaning-
ful. Likewise, to the extent individuals are motivated by the “irrational,” 
behavioral economics offers insights into their behavior.28 
In contrast, in the regulated context, strategic action fields are better 
described as involving both horizontal interactions among participants 
and vertical interactions between participants and regulators. Again, the 
distinction between the material and the existential is important. To the 
extent strategic action fields are best described as focused on material 
concerns, public choice theory offers some persuasive analysis of the 
relationships in such fields. Individual economic actors and groups are 
rationally pursuing advantages associated with regulation. Actors and 
groups that face costs associated with collective action will do less well 
than actors and groups with concentrated interests.29 
To the extent regulated strategic action fields exhibit existential 
characteristics, they are most usefully described using the language of 
sociology and behavioral economics. Nonprofit organizations, such as 
universities and hospitals, can be highly regulated and therefore interact 
substantially in a vertical manner with a range of government entities and 
individuals. These interactions are not strictly material but are governed 
by the kinds of social skills that matter in a particular area. Public univer-
                                                 
 27. FLIGSTEIN & MCADAM, supra note 1, at 49. 
 28. See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach 
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). 
 29. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (rev. ed. 1971). 
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sity presidents are skilled at demonstrating to legislators, and voters, why 
their missions deserve funds. Hospital administrators are skilled at 
demonstrating to regulators, or even prosecutors, why their practices are 
sound and in the best interests of patients and the community. The range 
of skills is social, yet vertical. 
In highly regulated strategic action fields, regulatory arbitrage30 can 
play a prominent role, in ways that are essentially irrelevant to unregulat-
ed fields. Regulatory arbitrage involves an array of transactions that are 
designed to achieve some favorable regulatory outcome, such as lower 
taxes, more favorable accounting treatment, lower regulatory costs (such 
as bank capital requirements), or—as I will discuss in Part II—a more 
favorable credit rating. There are unique social skills required in the im-
plementation of regulatory arbitrage, and they are far more important in 
the context of regulated strategic action fields than for unregulated fields. 
Each quadrant of the expanded theory presents unique challenges. I 
will not attempt to describe the details of the differences in each—that 
would require a book of the magnitude of A Theory of Fields. Instead, 
my goal is more modest. I simply want to introduce the notion that the 
application of Fligstein and McAdam’s theory varies depending on the 
degree of regulation that a strategic action field faces. 
The key point is that law matters. One can analyze a strategic action 
field as part of a purely private ordering system. Alternatively, one can 
analyze a strategic action field as part of a highly regulated environment. 
II. STRATEGIC ACTION FIELDS, LAW, AND CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
Bruce Carruthers has written several interesting and insightful arti-
cles about the role of credit rating agencies in society. 31  Professor 
Carruthers’s contribution is particularly interesting in its discussion of 
Frank Knight’s work: Carruthers argues that “Knightian uncertainty” 
plays a substantial role in the need for, and development of, credit ratings 
and credit rating agencies.32 
Carruthers documents an important shift in the role of credit rating 
agencies over time, from providing valuable and important information 
                                                 
 30. See Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. 
CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997); see also Jordan Barry, On Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE 
ALSO 69, 73 (2011); Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010). 
 31. See e.g., Bruce G. Carruthers, From Uncertainty Toward Risk: The Case of Credit Ratings, 
11 SOC.-ECON. REV. 525 (2013); Barry Cohen & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Risk of Rating: Negotiat-
ing Trust and Responsibility in 19th Century Credit Information, 93 SOCIÉTÉS CONTEMPORAINES 39 
(2014). 
 32. Bruce G. Carruthers, Presentation at the Berle VII Symposium: Credit Rating Agencies: 
Triggers, Thresholds, and Transmission Belts (May 27, 2015). 
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during the nineteenth century to their more problematic role more recent-
ly. Carruthers does not explicitly note the potential effect of a difference 
in legal regimes, but he and Barry Cohen find, even with respect to nine-
teenth-century credit ratings, there is a mismatch between agencies’ 
claims to expertise and their willingness to be held accountable and face 
legal consequences for the information they disseminated.33 
It is straightforward to apply the new regulated/unregulated strate-
gic action field model to these insights. The nineteenth-century regime in 
which credit raters operated was largely unregulated. Indeed, one of the 
interesting findings from this era was that credit raters explicitly sought 
to avoid law and legal liability and were successful in doing so. Accord-
ingly, the strategic action field in which credit raters operated during this 
time was largely governed by private ordering: these were primarily ma-
terial-focused economic actors seeking to obtain a favorable reputation in 
order to make a profit from their ratings. 
In contrast, when the raters became more highly regulated, the story 
changed in dramatic ways. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the regulation of 
credit ratings increased.34 Regulators began explicitly incorporating ref-
erences to credit ratings in their legal rules. The number of these refer-
ences increased. At the same time, the business model of raters shifted, 
from charging investors on a subscription basis to charging issuers.35 The 
nature of the strategic action field also changed dramatically. Over time, 
reputation came to play a less important role in the strategic action field. 
Instead, credit rating agencies survived and prospered by selling “regula-
tory licenses”36—keys that unlock financial regulation through sufficient-
ly high ratings—and earned sustainable profits even as their ratings came 
to include less valuable information.37 The raters did not suffer horizontal 
reputation costs in the field because regulation had introduced the im-
portance of verticality. Rating agency managers used social skill to take 
advantage of the new regulatory regime. 
Carruthers demonstrates flaws in earlier rating algorithms, and 
finds that many ratings were bad predictors of failure. In a private, large-
ly unregulated setting, one would expect that such ratings would not be 
valuable and therefore would command low prices in the market. In fact, 
                                                 
 33. See Cohen & Carruthers, supra note 31, at 39. 
 34. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the 
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 690–92 (1999). 
 35. See id. at 703. 
36. Id. at 698.  
 37. See John M. Griffin & Dragon Yongjun Tang, Did Credit Rating Agencies Make Unbiased 
Assumptions on CDOs?, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 125 (2011). 
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that was the case.38 In contrast, when the regulatory regime was intro-
duced, ratings became more expensive and rating agencies became far 
more profitable.39 
Thus, Carruthers’s research is enriched by understanding his de-
scriptions as bearing on strategic action fields in both an unregulated and 
regulated setting. As socially skilled actors, credit rating agencies ulti-
mately embraced legal rules and their powerful effects. The agencies’ 
social skills changed over time, as did the social order. 
As amended, Fligstein and McAdam’s theory applies nicely to the 
strategic action field related to credit ratings. There are a range of unique 
institutions and employees. They compete with each other in an oligopo-
listic setting. Their employees generate agency costs within the organiza-
tions and also begin to rotate vertically, into and out of government posi-
tions. Investors seize on the profitability of the top firms, as well as on 
highly rated, high-yielding bonds. Regulators exert power and influence, 
as do lawyers, academics, and the media. These interactions are clearly 
part of a meso-level social order, but they change markedly as the legal 
regime changes. 
Importantly, the pressure to move from uncertainty to risk is social. 
As actors in the strategic action field attempt to transform uncertainty 
into risk, they give practical application to Frank Knight’s theories.40 
Credit ratings create the perception that unspecifiable uncertainty really 
is specifiable risk. But the key insight is that “[a]s ratings became incor-
porated into formal regulations, starting in the 1930s, their use was bol-
stered even further by the coercive power of the state.”41 In my view, 
Carruthers’s research on credit ratings is illuminated by making this reg-
ulatory distinction explicit. 
It is worth noting another way in which the regulatory distinction 
might help clarify some of the analysis in A Theory of Fields. Specifical-
ly, Chapter 5 might meaningfully be amended to distinguish among high-
ly regulated and largely unregulated aspects of the relevant strategic ac-
tion fields. For example, Fligstein and McAdam note that owning a 
house is the linchpin of the American dream,42 and write that “because of 
                                                 
 38. Bruce G. Carruthers, Presentation at the Berle VII Symposium: Credit Rating Agencies: 
Triggers, Thresholds, and Transmission Belts (May 27, 2015). 
 39. For example, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s were among the most profitable companies 
in the world after the mid-1970s. See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not 
Like Other Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 64 
(Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006). 
 40. See Cohen & Carruthers, supra note 31. 
 41. Carruthers, supra note 31, at 541. 
 42. See FLIGSTEIN & MCADAM, supra note 1, at 140. 
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the quasi-governmental status of the GSE, it is a judgment call as to 
whether or not the mortgage strategic action field was really a field of the 
state.”43 Here, they recognize the importance of law. But they also de-
scribe the rating agencies as “one of the principal [Internal Governance 
Units] in the mortgage field,” without reference to regulation.44 
Fligstein and McAdam conclude that there were two causes of the 
mortgage crisis: easy credit and not enough conventional mortgages. 
They discuss the growth of the subprime mortgage market and then the 
high rate of foreclosures. However, their description might be enriched 
by making explicit the influences of the regulated and unregulated as-
pects of the strategic action field. The important regulated aspects of the 
field include both the “regulatory licenses” discussed above and the role 
of the government-sponsored entities in the mortgage market. 
However, the financial crisis was not centrally about the “cash” 
mortgage market. As Fligstein and McAdam note, the actual U.S. mort-
gage market peaked at approximately $4 trillion in 2003, fell to $3 tril-
lion in 2004–2006 and then to $2 trillion in 2007.45 What this data illus-
trates is a crucial, striking aspect of the strategic action field: side-betting 
on subprime mortgages. As “cash” mortgages declined, the appetite for 
“synthetic” exposure to mortgages increased. There was tremendous 
growth in both synthetic collateralized debt obligations and credit default 
swaps based on so-called super-senior tranches of such vehicles. Ulti-
mately, the near-failure of numerous large banks was tied importantly to 
this development in the strategic action field. At the same time, there 
were no explicit disclosure requirements related to such positions, there 
were no explicit margin requirements governing such positions, and there 
was only limited exposure to personal liability (either in civil or criminal 
cases, for both individuals and institutions). 
There is a rich, fascinating story about the development of this side-
betting in a largely unregulated context, but this story is largely missing 
from Fligstein and McAdam’s account. An expanded version of the theo-
ry of strategic action fields could accommodate both the perverse incen-
tives associated with the highly regulated aspects of the field and the 
perverse incentives associated with the largely unregulated aspects of the 
field. The regulatory distinction is an important part of the social dynam-
ic. Some analysis, particularly with respect to credit ratings, involves 
“more law”; other analysis, particularly with respect to derivatives based 
on the super-senior CDO tranches, involves “less law.” Both are useful 
                                                 
 43. See id. at 143. 
 44. See id. at 144. 
 45. See id. at 155. 
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and important, and the application of the theory of fields depends on the 
degree of law/regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
I want to conclude with one tertiary point about the application of 
the theory of strategic action fields to academia. Fligstein and McAdam 
turn to academia in Chapter 7, near the end of their book. They apply 
their arguments about strategic action fields to academics, noting that the 
social sciences generally can be seen as a strategic action field.46  
Chapter 7 is a cynical and depressing chapter. Although in other 
parts of their book, and throughout the Symposium, Fligstein and 
McAdam eloquently described the role and importance of the existential, 
the role of the existential is notably muted in their discussion of academ-
ia in Chapter 7. For example, the authors note that competition in the 
social sciences is largely local, between disciplines, and not within a par-
ticular area, and they conclude that “this disciplinary myopia represents 
another significant impediment to the accumulation of knowledge in the 
social sciences.”47 It is a bleak view. 
According to Fligstein and McAdam, social science academia is 
largely material in focus, though perhaps not in the pecuniary sense. In 
their description, scholars are often narrow-minded and are driven by the 
search for professional status within their fields.48 They are not primarily 
existential, in any meaningful way. 
However, one of the messages of this Symposium, and one of the 
fascinating aspects of Fligstein and McAdam’s view of strategic action 
fields generally, is that academics have existential capacity. We care 
about the search for knowledge. We want to think big, and to bring big 
ideas to bear on policy. We want to influence. 
I want to suggest here that in incorporating law into the theory of 
strategic action fields, we might recognize the extent to which social sci-
ence academics have the capacity for and interest in influencing policy. 
Chapter 7 suggests that academics answer narrowly in response to the 
“we are not alone” realization. Yet some academics have the version of 
social skills described in Fligstein and McAdam’s work; they are primar-
                                                 
 46. See id. at 208–09. 
 47. See id. at 209. Fligstein and McAdam criticize social science scholars as inward-looking 
and turf-protecting: “Scholars have an interest in trying to grow their career by shutting what they 
are doing off from what others are doing in order to claim novelty.” Id. 
 48. There is a good contrary argument: that academics should worry about their professional 
status outside their field, and that the route to stardom (and high citation counts) involves broadening 
an academic message so that it reaches numerous disciplines. 
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ily existential in focus. Chapter 7 is skeptical about the extent to which 
the scholarly enterprise in the social sciences is about collaborative 
meaning making. But that is what we were doing at Berle VII. 
